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Building on current research regarding constitutional migration, this article shows how 
constitutional provisions protecting religious freedom (“subject to public order”) arrived 
in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, not via colonial British or traditional Islamic sources—
both explicitly rejected—but via deliberate constitutional borrowing from “anti-colonial” 
precursors in Ireland and, especially, India. Drawing on Ernesto Laclau’s notion of “empty 
signifiers,” the article highlights the shifting political circumstances that transformed the 
meaning of Pakistan’s borrowed constitutional provisions. Even as core texts 
guaranteeing an individual’s right to peaceful religious practice were imported, political, 
legal, and conceptual modulations ensured that specific forms of peaceful religious 
practice were refashioned as a source of religious provocation and, therein, public 
disorder. Far from protecting religious freedom, this repurposing of imported 
constitutional clauses tied to “the politics of public order” underpinned the formal legal 
restriction of an otherwise explicit right.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Notwithstanding more than 100 years of British colonial rule, constitutional references 
to religious freedom in Pakistan are not rooted in English constitutional law. Nor, despite its 
formation as an “Islamic” republic, can they be traced to Islamic law. Instead, Pakistan’s 
constitutional references to religious freedom are bound up with an attachment to enumerated 
fundamental rights—an attachment directly inspired by the anti-colonial constitutional politics 
of Catholic-majority Ireland (1922, 1937) and Hindu-majority India (1950). Like Ireland and 
India, each of Pakistan’s three postcolonial constitutions (1956, 1962–63, 1973) states that 
every citizen is free to “profess, practice, and propagate his religion” even as each religious 
“denomination” is free to “manage its own affairs.” These two provisions, however, come with 
a crucial caveat. Both note that constitutional protections for religious freedom can be 
restricted in the event of public disorder.1 
What follows is an account of Pakistan’s relationship with this peripatetic legal 
formulation, highlighting longstanding debates regarding the ways in which laws travel. In one 
early contribution to these debates, Alan Watson (1974) stressed the relative autonomy of legal 
text, pointing to cases of direct textual transfer stretching from Persia’s adaptation of the 
Babylonian Code to Scotland’s engagement with the details of Roman law. Still, Watson was 
criticized—above all by Pierre Legrand (1997, 2001)—for his failure to appreciate what Legrand 
  
called the “cultural embeddedness” of law.2 Casting a skeptical eye on direct textual transfers, 
Legrand insisted that textual transplants often “fail” owing to intersubjective breaks unfolding 
at the level of legal meaning (see also Arvind 2010; Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard 2003; 
Osiatynski 2003; Small 2005).  
Watson and Legrand were interested in private rather than public or constitutional law 
(see Perju 2012, 1306–11).3 But, today, many of those with an interest in “constitutional 
migration” continue to stress “Watson v. Legrand” debates.4 In fact, recalling broad trends in 
linguistic social science—trends highlighting the gap between textual “signifiers” and what is 
actually “signified”—particular attention has been focused on the relative importance of 
migrating texts and what those texts are ultimately taken to mean (see Lévi-Strauss 1963; 
Saussure 1959).  
This article examines the shifting meaning of constitutional provisions regarding 
religious freedom as they traveled from Ireland, via India, to Pakistan. Focusing, in particular, on 
the link between India and Pakistan, I highlight the ways in which those who import foreign 
texts often engage those texts as “empty signifiers” (Laclau 1996). Seeing the clauses they 
import as texts with several possible meanings, they intervene as political actors, actively 
pressing for one.5 They do not deliberately misread the laws they import (see Nelken 2003). 
They simply reread them in ways that convey specific forms of meaning (see Cohn 2010, 583; 
Rosenfeld 2001–3, 72). Effectively, they recast their preferred interpretation of a particular 
foreign clause as a statement defining, even constituting, their own indigenous legal order. 
They are not passive recipients of law. Having actively imported specific texts, they deliberately 
remake their meaning. 
  
As noted above, Pakistan’s constitutional references to religious freedom were drawn, 
more or less verbatim, from Ireland via India. Within Pakistan, however, the balance of meaning 
associated with these provisions was politically transformed over time, shifting away from any 
focus on individual rights or the rights of religious minorities in favor of a new appreciation for 
the rights of Pakistan’s Muslim majority. Specifically, the rights of individuals and minorities 
succumbed to politically majoritarian claims that some religious practices—no matter how 
peaceful—offended Pakistan’s Muslim majority in ways that provoked public rioting. These 
practices, commonly associated with a religious minority known as the Ahmadiyya (less than 1 
percent of Pakistan’s population), were not treated as peaceful practices. Since the early to 
mid-1970s, these otherwise peaceful practices were treated as a source of public disorder—
indeed, a formal space of legal limitation targeting existing Ahmadi rights.  
Self-identifying as “Muslim,” the Ahmadiyya are defined by their link to a late-
nineteenth-century religious reformer named Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (d. 1908) who claimed to 
receive revelations (like a prophet) even after the Prophet Mohammad.6 The claims of Ghulam 
Ahmad are controversial. But, precisely insofar as Pakistani citizens are entitled to profess, 
practice, and propagate their religion within the bounds of “public order,” the state might have 
been expected to protect the Ahmadiyya insofar as they were engaged in peaceful religious 
practices. This is particularly true insofar as Pakistan’s “Irish” and “Indian” constitutional 
provisions regarding religious freedom were introduced to protect not merely individuals but 
also—and especially—minority religious groups (see Austin 1966, 55).  
Unfortunately, this minority-friendly reading of Pakistan’s imported constitutional 
provisions has not stood the test of time. Instead, this reading slowly faded in the wake of 
  
periodic but persistent public rioting—rioting perpetrated by religiously conservative groups 
insisting that Pakistan’s Ahmadiyya should not be construed as peaceful religious practitioners 
but, rather, as dangerously heretical provocateurs. In fact, since the 1970s, formal legal 
restrictions targeting the peaceful religious practices of the Ahmadiyya have come to be seen as 
entirely compatible with constitutional caveats stressing that religious freedoms can and should 
be limited in the event of public disorder. 
This “rereading” of Pakistan’s imported constitutional provisions reaches beyond a 
straightforward account of migrating legal texts (Watson). It also reaches beyond a narrow 
account of cultural embeddedness (Legrand) insofar as Pakistan’s “Islamic” culture might be 
thought to produce—almost inexorably—a failure of “Irish” or “Indian” law. Again, Pakistan’s 
late-twentieth-century rereading of its constitutional provisions regarding religious freedom 
was not tied to any reading of Islamic law or fiqh. On the contrary, the terms of Islamic law 
were explicitly ignored both in the Constituent Assembly (CA) that imported those provisions 
and during key moments of Supreme Court litigation specifically tasked with their 
interpretation. In the end, Pakistan’s rereading of its imported religious-freedom provisions 
grew out of a broadly political response to public rioting and, ultimately, the anti-provocation 
claims that underpinned an explicitly “majoritarian” legal response.  
To understand the claims that framed this majoritarian response, I set Pakistan’s 
imported clauses concerning religious freedom alongside three further constitutional 
provisions—three provisions concerning the special rights of Pakistan’s Muslim majority. The 
first, drawn from a portion of the constitution known as the Objectives Resolution, notes that 
within Pakistan the principles of freedom, equality, and tolerance “as enunciated by Islam” will 
  
be fully observed, even as Pakistan’s Muslim majority is enabled “to order their lives ... in 
accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam.”7 The second provision notes that, 
within Pakistan, the head of state must be a Muslim.8 The third provides for separate Muslim 
and non-Muslim electorates.9 Introduced by Pakistan’s first CA between 1949 and 1952, these 
provisions drew attention to the special rights of Pakistan’s Muslim majority—rights that anti-
Ahmadi protestors later claimed to defend.  
What follows is an account of Pakistan’s political rereading of its imported constitutional 
provisions.10 First, I focus on text, tracing the migration of specific constitutional provisions 
regarding religious freedom from Ireland, via India, to Pakistan. Next, I track Pakistan’s 
rereading of those provisions, turning away from Ireland and India to the majoritarian politics 
of public order and, therein, specific efforts to conjure up new constitutional meanings. 
Precisely insofar as these new meanings recast the peaceful but ostensibly provocative  
religious practices of the Ahmadiyya as a source of public disorder, I show how Pakistan’s 
Muslim majority excluded the Ahmadiyya from any formal legal defense of their (imported) 
constitutional rights. 
 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE CONSTITUTION OF PAKISTAN 
In 1922, the Irish Provisional Government published a detailed compendium entitled 
Select Constitutions of the World to inform the constitutional drafters of the Irish Free State. 
Containing eighteen up-to-date constitutions—including inter alia those of Weimar Germany, 
the United States of Mexico, and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic—this book was 
republished by B. Shiva Rao in 1934 to assist those addressing constitutional debates in India. 
  
Already, activists with ties to home-rule campaigners in both Ireland and India had begun to 
share constitutional provisions outlining a set of explicit and enforceable rights. In 1925, for 
instance, the anti-colonial theosophist Annie Besant published her famous “Commonwealth of 
India Bill” containing an explicit declaration of enumerated rights in terms “practically identical” 
to those previously framed in Dublin (Sorabjee 2004, 115; see also Austin 1966, 54). Indeed, 
constitutional developments in Ireland were closely watched in South Asia. When the Irish Free 
State gave way to the Republic of Ireland after 1937, for instance, constitutional provisions 
concerning individual rights were combined with a new appreciation (drawn from the 
experience of Eastern Europe during World War I) for the rights of minority groups; this change 
later resurfaced in the Constitution of India (1950) and, later still, in Pakistan (1956, 1962–63, 
1973). What follows is an account of this movement—this migration of constitutional text.  
 
From Ireland to India 
With specific reference to fundamental rights, the link between Ireland and India is 
unmistakable. Following the forty-third annual meeting of the Indian National Congress in 
Madras in 1927, Motilal Nehru responded to a British delegation known as the Simon 
Commission that had been dispatched to consider new forms of shared governance in India. A 
key portion of Nehru’s response drew on Annie Besant’s (largely “Irish”) Commonwealth of 
India Bill to frame a notion of Indian swaraj or self-rule.11 Indeed, the fundamental rights 
outlined in what came to be known as the Nehru Report “were in several cases taken word for 
word from … [Besant’s+ Bill,” with Granville Austin noting in his comprehensive account of 
constitutional drafting in India that Nehru’s treatment of fundamental rights was “a close 
  
precursor” of the constitutional rights that later surfaced in India. Ten out of nineteen 
subclauses, Austin (1966, 55) explains, “re-appeared materially unchanged,” with those 
concerning “the free profession and practice of religion” being motivated specifically by a focus 
on minority rights. 
This focus on the rights of minorities also reflected intervening developments in Ireland. 
Between 1922 and 1937, for instance, constitutional reformers in Ireland built on the “March” 
(1921) Constitution of Poland (Article 113) to address the competing interests of Ireland’s 
Catholic majority and Protestant minority, supplementing earlier provisions protecting each 
individual’s right to “profess” and “practice” his or her own religion with an appreciation for 
explicit rights allowing each “community,” “association,” or “denomination” to “manage its 
own affairs.”12 
These developments, originating in Eastern Europe before migrating to Ireland, were 
also accepted in India. In fact, even before India’s CA met for the first time in December 1946, 
three further volumes reflecting constitutional developments around the world were published 
to support its impending deliberations. Compiled by B. N. Rau, these volumes were collected 
under the title Constitutional Precedents, with specific sections devoted inter alia to 
fundamental rights (including religious freedom) and the rights of religious minorities (Rau 
1947). Volume I, for instance, included sections focused on minority “safeguards” with 
examples drawn from the “Polish Minorities Treaty” (1918) and the most recent Constitution of 
Ireland (1937). In fact all three volumes cited Ireland’s 1937 constitutional clauses concerning 
religious freedom:  
 
  
(a) “… the free profession and practice of religion are, subject to public order and 
morality, guaranteed to every citizen” (Constitution of Ireland, Article 44[2]-1) 
(b) “[e]very religious denomination shall have the right to manage its own affairs, [to] 
own, acquire, and administer property, movable and immovable, and [to] maintain 
institutions for religious and charitable purposes” (Article 44[2]-5).13  
 
Recalling forms of constitutional borrowing pioneered by Annie Besant, these provisions were 
subsequently embraced, more or less verbatim, in India. 
Initially, India’s CA was supposed to be drawn from India’s provincial assemblies 
following elections in January 1946. During the latter half of that year, however, elected 
members of Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s pro-Pakistan Muslim League worried that the provinces in 
which they held a majority would not be permitted to veto constitutional provisions they 
considered unacceptable. In fact, as a result of these concerns, they chose to boycott India’s CA 
(see Rau 1960, xxxi–lxx). Still, the CA carried on, with Congress leaders meeting in January 1947 
to nominate a special subcommittee focused on fundamental rights. This committee was 
convened in February 1947 and, within just two months, it had completed most of its work 
(Austin 1966, 61–68). As such, India’s constitutional provisions concerning religious freedom, 
drawn almost verbatim from Ireland, were agreed by India’s CA even before India and Pakistan 
were partitioned in August 1947 (63n48).  
 
From India to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
Pakistan’s CA met for the first time on August 10, 1947—four days before the creation 
  
of Pakistan itself. Seventy percent of its members were affiliated with the Muslim League; in 
fact its membership was composed of all those who had won seats during the provincial 
elections of 1946 but now belonged to so-called “Pakistan” districts.14 Of course, Pakistan’s CA 
did not proceed from scratch: the provisions already drafted during the spring of 1947 were 
readily available. But, even beyond this, the Secretary of Pakistan’s CA distributed India’s 
version of Ireland’s Select Constitutions of the World as well as a further compendium entitled 
Constitutions of Eastern Countries (M. Ahmad 1951) to support the work of his colleagues. 
Featuring eleven further constitutions—including those of the Republic of China, the 
Empire of Japan, and the Republic of the United States of Indonesia—this new volume 
addressing the constitutions of “Eastern” countries also contained an appendix with clauses 
drawn inter alia from the Republic of Turkey and the Kingdoms of Egypt, Iraq, and Iran.15 In his 
introduction, the Secretary of Pakistan’s CA noted that, although there was “a general tendency 
to draw inspiration from the West in political and constitutional matters,” the aim of this new 
compilation was “to place before the [CA] … the constitutional practice in Islamic States” as well 
as “some Muslim and non-Muslim countries” located in the “East” (M. Ahmad 1951, Preface).16  
Scholars of constitutional law have long argued that the best predictor of any new 
constitutional text lies in the constitution immediately preceding it (see Ginsburg, Melton, and 
Elkins 2010). With reference to religious freedom, however, the experience of both India and 
Pakistan is different. Neither country inherited its constitutional appreciation for religious 
freedom as an enumerated fundamental right from the constitutional experience of its former 
colonizer, Britain. Specifically, neither inherited this appreciation from the proto-constitutional 
language of colonial Britain’s departing “Government of India Act” (1935). Mirroring British 
  
constitutional traditions, this act firmly rejected enumerated and enforceable rights as an 
unacceptable constraint on the unfettered powers of Parliament (see Austin 1966, 58n30).  
Constitutional provisions regarding religious freedom are often treated as a distinctive 
legacy of Europe. Peter Danchin, for instance, treats the emergence of these protections 
outside of Europe as either nonexistent (in the case of individual freedoms) or derived from 
European intervention—what he calls “projection[s]” of “jus publicum europaeum” in a wider 
globalizing world (Danchin 2008, 467–68).17 Still, this focus on the influence of European legal 
authority is impossible to reconcile with the anti-colonial politics of Ireland, India, and Pakistan, 
each of which arrived at its appreciation for religious freedom precisely insofar as the 
constitutional traditions of Britain were rejected (see also Schonthal 2015).  
When Pakistan’s CA took up the issue of fundamental rights after 1951, it did not turn to 
Britain. It turned to India. In fact it scarcely altered the provisions concerning religious freedom 
that India had adopted from Ireland: Articles 44(2)-1 and 44(2)-5.18 Whereas India noted that 
“subject to public order, … all persons are equally entitled to … the right freely to profess, 
practice, and propagate religion,” with a proviso that this right would not prevent any 
legislation promoting social reform (Article 25), the Interim Report submitted to Pakistan’s first 
CA by its Fundamental Rights Committee stressed that, in Pakistan, “the right to profess, 
practice, and propagate religion” would be equally “guaranteed, subject to public order,” with a 
similar proviso that this would not prohibit any government legislation addressing “activity of a 
secular nature” (Article 10).19  
In fact, moving beyond the rights of individuals, India’s constitution went on to stress—
once again following Ireland (following Poland)—that:  
  
 
subject to public order, … every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have 
the right (a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious … purposes; (b) to 
manage its own affairs in matters of religion; (c) to own and acquire movable and 
immovable property; and (d) to administer [that] property in accordance with [the] law. 
(Article 26)  
 
Pakistan’s Fundamental Rights Committee simply reiterated that, “subject to public order, … 
every religious denomination or any section thereof” would be endowed with “freedom in the 
management of its religious affairs including the establishment and maintenance of religious … 
institutions and the acquisition of movable and immovable property for that purpose” (Article 
11).20  
Initially, Hindu members within Pakistan’s CA sought to postpone a discussion of 
religious freedom until a report from Pakistan’s Committee on Minority Rights had been 
published. But their colleague Abdulla-al-Mahmood deflected their concerns, noting that there 
should be no cause for alarm because Pakistan’s approach to religious freedom had been drawn 
directly from India. After all, recalling the (Motilal) Nehru Report of 1928, protections for 
religious freedom had long been associated with an appreciation for the rights of religious 
minorities. “Clause 10 [in Pakistan] has provided the same thing but on a … wider scale than 
what has been provided in Clause 35 [sic: 25]” in India, noted al-Mahmood. Clause 11 addresses 
“on a much wider scale the principles … [of] Clause 26” (Abdulla-al-Mahmood in Pakistan 
Constituent Assembly 1950, 78).  
  
Previously, Pakistan’s Hindu CA members had complained about the phrasing of the 
Objectives Resolution, arguing that any reference to the principles of freedom and equality “as 
enunciated by Islam” should be qualified as “not inconsistent with the [UN] Charter of … 
Fundamental Human Rights” (Barma and Chakravarty in Pakistan Constituent Assembly 1949a, 
30–31, 36). Still, Muslim CA members sought to downplay their concerns, drawing attention to 
the logic underpinning earlier efforts to import provisions concerning fundamental rights from 
India: “We [Muslims] thought [that] … our [imported] approach towards the rights of minorities 
would … create a better feeling” after partition, noted Sardar Abdur Rab Khan Nishtar, “and they 
[Hindus] would be considerate towards us also” (for example, with reference to provisions 
“enabling” Muslims to order their lives in accordance with “Islam”). “[U]nfortunately,” Nishtar 
complained, this sense of reciprocity was missing. In the end, he argued, defending the original 
phrasing of the Objectives Resolution, “they deny … us even this much” (Sardar Abdur Rab Khan 
Nishtar in Pakistan Constituent Assembly 1949b, 60). 
Clearly, an appreciation for both individual and group-based rights was present in both 
India and Pakistan. But, within Pakistan, the relative status of different religious groups 
emerged as a bone of contention. Accommodating Hindus with constitutional clauses 
imported from India did not extend much beyond Articles 10 and 11. In fact, Pakistani Hindus 
failed to persuade their Muslim colleagues to adopt Indian articles in two areas with direct 
implications for notions of religious “equality”: the first concerned a religious identity for 
Pakistan’s head of state; the second concerned the preservation of separate “communal” 
electorates.21 
 
  
Religious Freedom in a Muslim-Majority Republic 
The decision to specify that Pakistan’s head of state must be a Muslim did not 
originate in Pakistan’s CA. Instead, it reflected the views of Muslim religious leaders serving on 
a separate advisory board known as the Talimat-e-Islamia Board (Board of Islamic 
Education).22 This Board was convened alongside the CA by a subcommittee of the CA known 
as the Basic Principles Committee (BPC) (see Nelson 2016). Initially, its views pressing for an 
“Islamic” state in Pakistan were rejected. But, in due course, these views were rearticulated in 
an ambitious twenty-two-point manifesto submitted to the CA by a wider group of ulema 
(religious scholars) and lay religious activists.23 Completed in 1951, this religious manifesto 
was not rejected out of hand; instead, the members of the BPC chose to respond more 
carefully. First, in a bid to co-opt elite religious opinion, the BPC explained that most of the 
manifesto’s key points were already covered by the terms of Pakistan’s preambular Objectives 
Resolution. Second, they noted that many of the remaining points (for example, a call for 
strengthening fraternal relations with Muslim countries while discouraging sectarian 
sentiments) could be accommodated via so-called “directive principles.”24 Having set aside 
most of the original twenty-two-point manifesto, however, the BPC considered one exception. 
This exception, noting that Pakistan’s head of state should be a “Muslim” (point 12), was put 
to a vote and accepted in August 1952 (Binder 1961, 226). 
The second area pertaining to matters of religious equality and, more specifically, the 
relative status of Muslims and non-Muslims, concerned the preservation of communal 
electorates. This issue came to a head during the spring of 1952 when, despite the dominant 
position of the Muslim League, several League members within Pakistan’s CA faced intra-
  
Muslim challengers during forthcoming provincial elections in East Bengal. At this point, the 
League intervened to prevent Pakistani Hindus (roughly 25 percent of East Bengal’s 
population) from positioning themselves as “kingmakers,” ensuring that, although non-Muslims 
were entitled to vote, they would not be permitted to vote for Muslims. Hindu CA members 
objected to this preservation of communal electorates as a pernicious colonial anachronism. 
But, in the end, a separate electorate for “non-Muslims” was approved by a majority vote of 
the BPC (Pakistan Constituent Assembly 1952, 220).25 
On their own, these two provisions concerning a “Muslim” head of state and a 
separate “non-Muslim” electorate sought to demarcate a special place for Pakistan’s Muslim 
majority while preserving the rights of Pakistan’s non-Muslim minorities. But, together, they 
also set the stage for a number of changes in the meaning of religious freedom—changes in 
which, slowly but surely, the religious freedoms outlined in Articles 10 and 11 came to mean 
different things for Pakistani Muslims and non-Muslims. The key distinction did not involve 
those who saw themselves as “non-Muslims” (for example, Hindus). Instead it emerged 
between Pakistan’s Muslim majority and a heterodox minority—the Ahmadiyya—whose 
pattern of religious self-identification (as “Muslim”) was treated as a source of controversy.  
 
Religious Freedom in Pakistan: 1956, 1962–63, and 1973 
Pakistan’s first constitution (1956) was cut short by General Ayub Khan following a 
military coup in 1958. The Constitution Commission convened by Ayub to prepare Pakistan’s 
second constitution, however, chose to retain all of the articles concerning religious freedom 
that Pakistan had imported from India—in this case, renumbering Articles 10 and 11 as Articles 
  
10(a) and 10(b). “In the constitution[s] of Eire, India, and the late Constitution [of Pakistan],” 
noted Ayub’s Constitution Commission, “fundamental rights are specific and protected” (Report 
of the Constitution Commission 1961, 101). “The question” was simply whether these rights 
should be, as in Ireland and India, “incorporated in the new Constitution” or left, “as in the 
United Kingdom, to the fundamental good sense of the legislature and the [periodic] operation 
of the … courts” (101).26  
A public-opinion survey conducted by Ayub’s hand-picked Constitution Commission 
revealed that the “[p]reponderance” of public opinion (98 percent) still favored a constitutional 
chapter explicitly devoted to the enumeration of enforceable rights (Report of the Constitution 
Commission 1961, 101).27 Unfortunately, this preponderance of public opinion was not 
sufficient to prevent Ayub from relegating these rights to an entirely new set of (nonjusticiable) 
“Principles of Law-Making” when he unveiled his new constitution in 1962. Massive protests, 
however, soon compelled Ayub to reconsider. In fact, the following year, a suite of 
constitutional amendments was promulgated to restore Pakistan’s fundamental rights to their 
original justiciable position. Reporting from Islamabad, Ralph Braibanti observed that no 
feature of Ayub’s 1962 constitution “provoked greater opposition than [its] elimination of 
[fundamental] rights and the power of the courts to enforce them” (Braibanti 1965, 79).  
When Pakistan’s third constitution emerged in 1973—following a crushing civil war, war 
with India, and the separation of East Pakistan as Bangladesh—every indication suggested that 
Pakistan’s new regime had learned the lessons of its predecessors. Specifically, with the end of 
General Ayub’s martial law and the restoration of Pakistan’s National Assembly (doubling as a 
Constituent Assembly), Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto opted to retain the explicit and 
  
enforceable religious-freedom provisions that Pakistan had imported from India. He simply 
renumbered them: Article 20(a) focused on “individuals”; Article 20(b) focused on “groups.”  
By 1973, the history of Pakistan’s constitution, vis-à-vis religious freedom, seemed to 
reflect a case of textual consolidation and convergence targeting global (even “liberal”) 
norms.28 Indeed, as key provisions passed from Ireland (44[2]-1; 44[2]-5) and India (25; 26) to 
Pakistan (20[a]; 20[b]), core elements were carefully and consistently preserved: as texts, their 
stability was remarkable. But, as noted above, the challenge does not lie in tracking the 
stability of text. The challenge lies in grasping the political drivers that press for new strains of 
meaning in a legal space directly underpinned by such texts.  
 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN PAKISTAN 
Turning to an account of constitutional politics, I do not ask what a traveling right to 
religious freedom “truly” means. Nor, turning to an account of legal culture, do I ask what 
religious freedom might mean in an ostensibly “Islamic” culture like Pakistan. Instead, moving 
beyond Alan Watson (traveling texts, stable meanings) and Pierre Legrand (shifting cultures, 
shifting meanings), I turn to political patterns of textual “resignification” as these emerge in the 
notion of “empty signifiers” articulated by Ernesto Laclau (1996). In particular, I ask how a 
deeper understanding of Pakistan’s political landscape might help to explain, with specific 
reference to religious freedom, how one strain of legal meaning linking the terms of public 
order to a defense of peaceful religious practice slowly yielded to another in which an account 
of specific forms of public disorder was deployed to achieve a targeted restriction of rights. 
What were the political factors that drove this rereading of Pakistan’s imported constitutional 
  
provisions? What were the majoritarian political factors that, stable constitutional provisions 
notwithstanding, drove Pakistan’s constitutional “resignification” over time? 
 
Religious Freedom and the Politics of Public Order 
Initially, some expected the references to “Islam” in Pakistan’s preambular Objectives 
Resolution to undercut Pakistan’s constitutional commitment to the enforcement of basic rights 
(Lau 2006), pulling away from a colonial approach to minority governance (via religious self-
identification and the enforcement of religious personal laws) in favor of a postcolonial 
approach in which “Islamic” law would define who was (and who was not) a Muslim entitled to 
serve inter alia as the country’s head of state. Preambular references to “Islam,” however, were 
not legally enforceable. In fact, it quickly emerged that any state-based effort to define who 
was (and who was not) a member of Pakistan’s Muslim majority would require either default 
recognition for religious self-identification or some type of legal reform. 
Even before Pakistan’s first constitution emerged in 1956, conservative Muslim activists 
sought to clarify the boundaries of Pakistan’s Muslim community, focusing specifically on the 
status of local Ahmadiyya. As noted above, the Ahmadiyya identify as “Muslim,” but this identity 
is contested owing to claims attributed to the group’s founder, Ghulam Ahmad, that he was not 
merely a religious reformer but a prophet—indeed, a prophet after Mohammad. Some 
conservative activists argued that, given the heterodox nature of this claim, Pakistan’s 
Ahmadiyya should be defined as “non-Muslim.” In fact they insisted that, as “non-Muslims,” the 
Ahmadiyya should be barred from serving as head of state and relegated to Pakistan’s separate 
non-Muslim electorate. After 1952, some of those previously involved in drafting the twenty-
  
two points pressing for a Muslim head of state turned to anti-Ahmadi pogroms to express this 
religious-cum-political view (see Binder 1961, 259–96). 
Many of those seeking to formalize a non-Muslim identity for the Ahmadiyya had 
opposed the Pakistan Movement led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah. They opposed this movement 
as an articulation of territorial Muslim nationalism threatening to divide South Asia’s Muslim 
community between India and the two wings of Pakistan. In short, they opposed territorial 
nationalism as a threat to the cohesion of the global Muslim community or ummah. After the 
formation of Pakistan in 1947, however, many of these activists felt compelled to rehabilitate 
their patriotic credentials.29 While some hoped to influence the text of the constitution, others 
sought to highlight what they saw as a key point of doctrinal consensus within Pakistan’s 
grassroots Muslim majority.30 Specifically, pressing for an “Islamic” state grounded in a cohesive 
Muslim identity, they sought to frame a “non-Muslim” identity for Pakistan’s Ahmadiyya.  
In 1952–53, several activists associated with a religious-cum-political formation known 
as the Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam (Council of “Free” Muslims), as well as the Jama’at-e-Islami (Party 
of Islam), took to the streets of the Punjab in a series of violent protests demanding that 
Pakistan’s Ahmadiyya be assigned to Pakistan’s “non-Muslim” electorate.31 Their protests came 
to an end with a declaration of martial law; in fact, key actors like Abul ala Maududi, the leader 
of the Jama’at-e-Islami, were charged with treason for supporting (however reluctantly) 
vigilante violence in defiance of state authority.32 Faced with widespread rioting as a case of 
public disorder, however, the state’s decision to invoke its emergency powers (i.e. martial law) 
was not used to restrict the rights of the Ahmadiyya. Instead, the army intervened to protect the 
public, including the Ahmadiyya, against forms of violence perpetrated by religious vigilantes 
  
(see Report of the Court of Inquiry 1954; Saeed 2018, 101–2).  
When the dust finally settled, Pakistan’s CA turned its attention away from the army’s 
martial-law-based defense of public order to consider fresh provisions defending against any 
further military encroachments on the domain of civilian power, including constitutional 
provisions preventing any unilateral effort, on the part of the executive, to reimpose martial 
law (see Binder 1961, 352–59; Choudhury 1963, 48). This push to reassert the terms of civilian 
control, however, reignited enduring tensions between Pakistan’s CA and the country’s 
powerful executive—tensions that came to a head when Pakistan’s executive Governor-General 
intervened to dissolve Pakistan’s CA in October 1954. 
A second CA was convened to complete Pakistan’s first constitution shortly thereafter, 
in 1956. But, as noted above, this first constitution was set aside two years later following a 
military coup led by General Ayub Khan. Pakistan’s second constitution, promulgated by Ayub 
in 1962 and amended in 1963, did not alter the religious freedom provisions that Pakistan had 
initially imported from India. In fact, during the last eight months of Ayub’s regime, Pakistan’s 
Supreme Court intervened to clarify Pakistan’s constitutional approach to religious freedom, 
paying particular attention to the link between religious freedom and questions of public 
order. 
The 1969 case of Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri v. West Pakistan reviewed a set of 
sanctions imposed by the provincial government of the Punjab on a weekly publication known 
as Chattan (Rock).33 Famous for inflammatory rhetoric attacking the Ahmadiyya, Chattan’s 
founder and editor, A. K. Shorish Kashmiri, was associated with the Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam, 
which led the riots of 1952–53 before being faced with a declaration of martial law. A further 
  
state of martial law had been declared during Pakistan’s 1965 war with India. But, in the case of 
A. K. Shorish Kashmiri (1969), the Supreme Court did not draw attention to any link between 
inflammatory rhetoric, public disorder, and the constraints of “martial law.” Instead, the Court 
stressed that, even apart from any formal declaration of martial law, the government was duly 
empowered by the constitutional language of Article 20—known, at the time, as Article 10—to 
prohibit any inflammatory publication of a religious nature that might pose a risk to “public 
order.” In effect, the Court upheld the provincial government’s sanctions, reiterating that a 
constitutional right to religious freedom could be lawfully restricted precisely insofar as that 
right touched on matters of “public order,” “public office,” or “property’ (see Saeed 2018, 185).  
This was a rather conventional reading of Pakistan’s imported constitutional provisions 
regarding religious freedom. However, the demise of General Ayub’s dictatorship in March 
1969, followed by the brutal civil war that liberated East Pakistan in 1971, dramatically altered 
the ways in which existing provisions concerning religious freedom were read. In particular, the 
separation of East Pakistan as Bangladesh, followed by Pakistan’s return to civilian rule, 
prompted fresh efforts to shore up the power of Pakistan’s Parliament while, at the same time, 
promoting renewed efforts to offset concerns about the divisive effects of “provincialism” with 
a reinvigorated appreciation for “Muslim” majoritarian nationalism. These efforts culminated in 
two constitutional changes that shifted the ways in which Article 10 (later, Article 20) and, thus, 
the politics of religious freedom were understood.  
 
Indigenizing Imported Text 
The first change emerged during the promulgation of Pakistan’s third constitution in 
  
1973. Even apart from this constitution’s specification of Islam as Pakistan’s state religion 
(Article 2), a new schedule (Schedule 3) was introduced requiring each president and prime 
minister to swear an oath, not only that he or she was a “Muslim,” but also, to clarify, that he or 
she believed the Prophet Mohammad was truly “the last of the Prophets.”  
The second adjustment emerged one year later in the form of Pakistan’s second 
constitutional amendment (1974). This amendment modified Article 260, regarding definitions, 
to declare that, within Pakistan, a “Muslim” would be defined as one who “does not believe in, 
or recognize as a prophet or religious reformer, any person who claimed or claims to be a 
prophet … after Muhammad.”  
Returning to the underlying politics of constitutional interpretation, these two 
adjustments set in motion several changes in the meaning of Pakistan’s imported constitutional 
provisions regarding religious freedom. A proper understanding of the political factors 
underpinning these changes, however, requires some appreciation for the targeted violence 
surrounding them. In 1973, almost immediately after the approval of Pakistan’s third 
constitution, the same religious activists who had challenged Pakistan’s approach to the rights 
of the Ahmadiyya during the 1950s and 1960s—groups like the Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam (already 
refashioned, with religious parties like the Jama’at-e-Islami, as an activist collective known as 
the Majlis-e-Amal [Council of Action])—reasserted themselves in yet another round of anti-
Ahmadi skirmishes. Prime Minister Bhutto was unsettled by these skirmishes, but he did not 
respond with another round of martial law. Instead, following further violence in May 1974, he 
nominated a high-level judicial commission under Supreme Court Justice Khwaja Mohammad 
Ahmad Samdani to investigate the violence alongside a parliamentary Committee of the Whole 
  
House chaired by the speaker of the National Assembly and managed by the attorney general 
(see Qasmi 2014, 176–77, 180). This committee was asked to decide whether, and how, in light 
of existing provisions concerning religious freedom, the formal legal status of the Ahmadiyya 
(as “Muslims” or “non-Muslims”) might be clarified.  
Initially, Bhutto sought to determine whether the existing legal status of the Ahmadiyya 
should be examined by the Supreme Court or Pakistan’s (advisory) Council of Islamic Ideology. 
In the absence of any claim suggesting that Pakistani laws governing the Ahmadiyya were “un-
Islamic” or somehow unsatisfactory, however, he eventually turned away from these two 
bodies (both empowered to review existing laws) in favor of a fresh inquiry regarding the value 
of future statutory or constitutional reforms—above all, reforms targeting the reach of religious 
self-identification as a manifestation of one’s otherwise constitutionally protected right to 
religious “profession.”  
Bhutto’s turn to a parliamentary committee managed by the attorney general was not 
surprising given Pakistan’s recent return to civilian rule after more than ten years of military 
dictatorship. However, with respect to Pakistan’s reading of religious freedom, this push in the 
direction of parliamentary power, and therein the pursuit of majority sentiment, was pivotal. 
Briefly, conservative religious activists returned to reiterate what they saw as a “majoritarian” 
concern regarding the ways in which, in describing themselves as “Muslims,” Pakistan’s 
Ahmadiyya diluted Muslim access to distinctive constitutional rights: access to a Muslim 
presidency and/or a dedicated Muslim electorate (see Qasmi 2014, 189, citing Hazarwi; see also 
Hazarwi, n.d.). In fact, to defend these rights, the activists in question sought to reverse the 
onus of responsibility for any violence that might surround their protests. Whereas, in the past, 
  
the Ahmadiyya had been cast as the victims of vigilante protesters, these protesters now saw 
themselves as victims—victims of Ahmadi religious self-identification (as a form of doctrinal 
“provocation”) and, turning to Muslim constitutional rights, such as access to the presidency, 
victims of an unlawful form of “encroachment.” 
Struggling with ruling coalitions tied to conservative religious parties in two out of 
Pakistan’s four provinces (Balochistan and Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province), Prime 
Minister Bhutto did not resist the “majoritarian” arguments put forward by these religious 
activists (see also Saeed 2018, 127–28). Instead, he sought to coopt them, linking their concerns 
about Ahmadi “provocation” directly to an appreciation for constitutional provisions focused on 
“public order.” With a nod to some of his erstwhile opponents in the Jama’at-e-Islami, for 
instance, Bhutto’s parliamentary Committee of the Whole House turned its attention to the 
promulgation of a constitutional amendment—the constitution’s second amendment—targeting 
the definition of a Muslim in the context of Article 260 (“Definitions”).  
Ahmadi leaders were invited to defend their community’s religious identity before the 
parliamentarians charged with considering this amendment. Some of their remarks, however, 
were not confined to the text of the constitution. In fact, recalling some of the views initially 
articulated by Pakistani Hindus during Pakistan’s first CA, Mirza Nasir Ahmad (a grandson of 
Ghulam Ahmad), couched his defense of religious freedom—and, specifically, religious self-
identification—in a wider set of principles regarding freedom of conscience broadly articulated 
by the UN (Qasmi 2014, 185–86). 
Unfortunately, conservative religious parliamentarians like Ghulam Ghaus Hazarwi 
were broadly unsympathetic to such global references. Hazarwi suggested that, within Pakistan, 
  
improved constitutional guidance was needed, not only to settle the rights of the Ahmadiyya as 
citizens, but also (and especially) to prevent any further encroachment on Muslims’ ability to 
manage their own affairs (Qasmi 2014, 189, citing Hazarwi). His logic was simple: if as per the 
constitution Pakistan’s Muslim majority was endowed with special rights and privileges, such as 
access to the presidency, it followed that the state must be able to identify who, exactly, was a 
Muslim. “The state,” he noted, “must be able to … identify [both] its Muslim and [its] non-
Muslim citizens” (195).  
To accomplish this, the attorney general did not believe the government was required to 
prioritize each individual’s right to religious self-identification.34 With a two-thirds majority in 
both houses, he explained instead that Pakistan’s Parliament was fully empowered to amend 
the constitution, subjecting even fundamental rights to certain “limitations” (see Kazi 2015, 91; 
Qasmi 2014, 192–93, 196). As such, Article 260 was amended, with no opposing votes and only 
a few abstentions, to ensure that a “Muslim” was defined as one who did not believe in “any 
person who claimed or claims to be a prophet … after Muhammad.” As Sadia Saeed (2018, 139) 
points out, “Bhutto wanted the amendment to go through” to boost his “popularity.”  
Reaching beyond the views of religious activists and those associated with conservative 
religious parties to accommodate a much wider appreciation for “majoritarian” political 
pressure, Pakistan’s parliamentarians clearly wrestled with the many possible meanings of a 
concept like “religious freedom” while, at the same time, actively pressing for one. In fact, 
throughout the ensuing debates, Pakistan’s attorney general noted that Parliament was 
empowered to guard against any encroachment on Muslim constitutional prerogatives—
encroachments that, he argued, might engender some form of “tangible material damage,” 
  
such as diluted access to the presidency, followed by popular resistance in the form of “public 
disorder.” To preempt this disorder, he simply noted that Parliament was entitled to craft 
constitutional amendments targeting legal “definitions” (Article 260) and “oaths” (Schedule 
3)—amendments that legally prevented the Ahmadiyya from pursuing what the attorney 
general saw as dangerously provocative forms of religious “false belonging” (Qasmi 2014, 193, 
224). 
 
Ireland and India as Empty Signifiers 
Although Pakistan’s second constitutional amendment redefined the Ahmadiyya as 
“non-Muslims” in 1974, Pakistan’s superior judiciary did not immediately abandon its previous 
reading of Article 20. In 1978, for instance, the Lahore High Court issued a rather nuanced 
judgment in the case of Abdul Rehman Mubashir v. Amir Ali Shah, holding that, although official 
recognition of the Ahmadiyya as “Muslims” was constitutionally barred, their fundamental right 
to peaceful religious practice (as citizens) was not affected.35 In effect, the Court held that the 
peaceful religious practices of the Ahmadiyya—focusing, specifically, on references to Ahmadi 
places of worship as “mosques” and the Ahmadi call to prayer as an “azaan”—were neither a 
deliberate provocation nor a threat to Muslim property. Again, recalling the case of A. K. 
Shorish Kashmiri (1969), the Court reiterated that Pakistan’s Ahmadiyya could only be excluded 
from “Muslim” matters already defined in law—for example, matters of public office or tangible 
forms of property. The notion that references to an Ahmadi “mosque” or an Ahmadi “azaan” 
might offend local Muslims in ways that posed a risk to public order was rejected as entirely 
“sentimental.”36 
  
At the same time, however, just across the border in India, the Indian Supreme Court 
had also begun to assess its own understanding of group-based rights, highlighting, in particular, 
the power of the state to identify the constitutionally protected “essential” practices of any 
religious denomination and, by extension, any “nonessential” practices subject to regulation or 
reform (T. Ahmad 2014, 13). This “Indian” notion that states were empowered to regulate or 
reform the nonessential practices of any religion was also in place during Pakistan’s first CA 
(1947–54), wherein a provisional article (Article 12) was included in the Interim Report issued 
by the CA’s Fundamental Rights Committee stipulating that, “subject to regulations,” every 
denomination “shall have the right to procure … articles which are proved as being essential for 
worship.” This article, however, was dropped from Pakistan’s constitution in 1956, forcing 
Pakistani judges to rely on jurisprudence from India rather than their own constitution 
whenever they sought to consider the statutory regulation of any religious practice that might 
be considered “nonessential.”  
Indian and Pakistani judges, however, adopted very different approaches to the notion 
of essential and nonessential religious practices. Whereas India sought to regulate nonessential 
religious practices, for instance, Pakistan sought to protect various Muslim practices from 
adverse forms of encroachment while, at the same time, targeting essential non-Muslim 
practices as a provocation to public disorder and legally restricting them as such.37 
During the dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977–88), Pakistani officials facing yet 
another round of violent religious protests by anti-Ahmadi activists stepped in to further 
restrict the constitutional meaning of religious freedom with specific reference to an 
understanding of “nonessential” religious practices. In particular, they prohibited the 
  
Ahmadiyya from using ostensibly Muslim words (for example, masjid for their place of worship) 
and Muslim practices (for example, the azaan for their call to prayer), describing any Ahmadi 
attachment to such words and practices as “nonessential” to the practice of the Ahmadi faith—
indeed, a provocative form of encroachment on the special religious “property” of Muslims.38  
This notion that Muslim property might include familiar words like masjid or practices 
like the azaan had already emerged in comments made by Pakistan’s attorney general during 
the parliamentary debates surrounding the constitution’s second amendment in 1974 (Qasmi 
2014, 192). But, after 1985, General Zia intervened to reinforce these comments with explicit 
statutory reforms, modifying Section 298 of the Pakistan Penal Code—a colonial anti-
blasphemy law seeking to protect both inter- and intra-religious harmony—in order to ensure 
that, legally speaking, the Ahmadiyya would no longer be permitted to access words like masjid 
or practices like the azaan insofar as these were seen as “proprietary” features of Islam.39 In 
effect, Zia responded to ongoing religious protests with a combination of constitutional 
resignification and legal appeasement. Whereas, in the past, Ahmadi references to the azaan 
were cast as peaceful forms of religious practice and protected as such, such references were 
now barred as a form of religious provocation that “offended” other Muslims and encroached 
on Muslim “property” in ways that posed an unconstitutional threat to public order.  
This property- and public-order-based effort to limit the peaceful religious practices of 
the Ahmadiyya was soon taken up in a landmark Supreme Court case known as Zaheeruddin v. 
The State (1993).40 In this case, a group of Ahmadiyya plaintiffs urged the Court to overturn 
their prior convictions for wearing badges bearing the kalima (the Muslim profession of faith) 
and celebrating an Ahmadi holiday—the centenary of Ghulam Ahmad’s contested revelations—
  
in the Punjabi city of Jhang (Lau 1994; Mahmud 1995). The Supreme Court, however, turning 
inter alia to Pakistan’s constitution (Article 20), Pakistan’s (revised) Penal Code (Section 298), and 
a series of Indian Supreme Court judgments regarding the meaning of “essential” religious 
practices, upheld their convictions (see T. Ahmad 2014, 11). It upheld their convictions in light 
of three points directly seeking to empty Pakistan’s imported religious-freedom provisions of 
their prior meaning while, at the same time, filling them up again with politically situated forms 
of new meaning.  
First, turning to the exclusive “property” of Muslims, the Court reframed several Indian 
and American Supreme Court judgments to argue that “[the] Ahmadis, as non-Muslims, could 
not use Islamic epithets in public [for example, during their celebrations in Jhang] without 
violating … *Pakistani+ trademark laws” (Khan 2010–11, 509). In particular, the court held that, 
just as a public office like the presidency had been construed as a type of Muslim property, 
Muslims alone held a proprietary claim to certain religious words and practices.41 
Second, turning to the matter of “essential” religious practices, the Court drew on a 
series of Indian Supreme Court judgments to insist that, whenever questions emerged 
regarding the essence of a particular faith, the group seeking to avoid regulation was required 
to prove the essential features of its religion in court. Because the Ahmadiyya had, apparently, 
failed to prove that their celebrations in Jhang were “essential,” the Court explained that those 
celebrations could be described as “nonessential” and, then, legally regulated as such—
without, the Court determined, undermining a fundamental right to practice the Ahmadi faith.  
Finally, and most importantly, returning to Article 20, the Court suggested that, within 
Pakistan, Ahmadi religious practices, however peaceful, “angered and offended the Sunni 
  
majority; … *so+ to maintain law and order, Pakistan would … need to control *them+” (Khan 2003, 
228; 2010–11, 509).42 As Amjad Mahmood Khan (2003) points out, this reading of the 
constitution’s reference to public order in Article 20—a nearly ubiquitous feature of religious-
freedom provisions around the world—dramatically shifted Pakistan’s reading of the 
constitutional provisions it had initially imported from India. In particular, Pakistan’s reading of 
religious freedom opted to restrict “essential” and “peaceful” Ahmadi practices as dangerously 
“provocative” in a preemptive bid to avoid any future violence by Pakistan’s Muslim majority.43  
 
Religious Freedom, Public Order, and Majoritarian Parliamentary Power 
Recalling Legrand’s notion of intersubjective or interpretive “failure” in the realm of 
legal transplants, Amjad Mahmood Khan (2010–11) and Tariq Ahmad (2014) argue that, in the 
case of Zaheeruddin, Pakistan’s Supreme Court actively “mistranslated” specific foreign laws—
both Indian and American constitutional laws as well as international human rights laws. 
Unfortunately, this assessment revives a number of questions regarding the link between 
specific legal texts and the larger political contexts within which legal meanings are created. 
What were the domestic political factors that drove the Court’s reasoning in Zaheeruddin? 
What were the political factors that shaped Pakistan’s approach to the meaning of its imported 
constitutional texts?  
Focusing on what she calls “core juridical signifiers” (that is, fundamental rights) in the 
landmark case of Zaheeruddin, Saeed (2011) examines the ways in which Pakistan invested 
specific constitutional principles with new forms of meaning that dramatically recast the 
“rights” of the Ahmadiyya.44 In particular, she attributes Pakistan’s repurposing of 
  
constitutional provisions regarding religious freedom to the influence of General Zia-ul-Haq 
during the early to mid-1980s (Saeed 2018, 198). This focus on the military dictatorship of 
General Zia, however, is difficult to situate within the historical sequence of Pakistan’s legal 
record—above all, the fact that crucial Supreme Court decisions seeking to protect the 
Ahmadiyya (such as Mubashir 1978) were delivered after the coup that brought Zia to power 
and, moreover, the fact that key decisions restricting the rights of the Ahmadiyya (such as 
Zaheeruddin 1993) were delivered after Zia had died and, indeed, after the fundamental 
rights outlined in Pakistan’s 1973 constitution were restored.  
Broadly, Saeed’s focus on the Islamizing dictatorship of General Zia is difficult to 
reconcile with the fact that much of the political energy driving restrictions on the religious 
freedom of the Ahmadiyya—for example, the constitution’s second amendment (1974)—
emerged before the arrival of Zia’s dictatorship via assertions of majoritarian parliamentary 
power (Saeed 2011, 4, 22). Clearly, Zia’s push to amend the Pakistan Penal Code concerning 
blasphemy (Section 298) extended what Parliament had begun. But, since 1974, despite 
numerous efforts to annul ostensibly “religious” ordinances promulgated both by General Ayub 
(regarding Muslim inheritance) and by General Zia (regarding adultery and rape), neither 
Pakistan’s Supreme Court nor its National Assembly has ever sought to annul or repeal Zia’s 
amendments in the realm of blasphemy as these pertain to the “offensive” practices of the 
Ahmadiyya or issues of religious freedom.45 In fact, as Saeed herself points out, quoting former 
Supreme Court judge Fakhruddin Ebrahim, who served as lead counsel for the Ahmadiyya 
during the early stages of Zaheeruddin, the judges who decided Zaheeruddin in 1993 were not 
beholden to Zia. Like Bhutto twenty years before, they were simply “afraid … of becoming 
  
unpopular” (Saeed 2011, 33; 2018, 205; see also Mahmud 1995, 83, 96). 
Turning away from General Zia, Martin Lau’s (2006) assessment of “Islamization” in the 
context of Pakistan’s superior courts is well known. But, as an explanation for Pakistan’s efforts 
to “fill up” imported constitutional provisions with new forms of legal meaning, Lau’s focus on 
religious reasoning within the judiciary ignores the fact that “Islamic” reasoning was notably 
absent in several key decisions concerning religious freedom: Kashmiri (1969), Mubashir (1978), 
and Mujibur Rahman (1988), as well as Zaheeruddin (1993).46 These decisions conspicuously 
avoided any reference to Islam on key points of law, preferring, instead, references to Indian or 
American judgments regarding the parameters of religious property and public order.47 Indeed, 
as Anser Aftab Kazi (2015, 123, 126–27) points out, the jurisprudential record in cases like 
Zaheeruddin shows how religious freedom was actually “translated into, and proscribed 
within,” a secular liberal legal order. Pulling away from Lau and Legrand, in other words, 
Pakistan’s new reading of religious freedom was not a religious reading. It was, by and large, a 
majoritarian political reading rooted in secular notions of property, provocation, and public 
order. 
Focusing specifically on the Ahmadiyya, Ali Usman Qasmi (2014) does not trace the 
shifting meaning of religious freedom to the interventions of Pakistani generals or judges. 
Instead, he traces it to the political work of conservative religious parties sitting in Pakistan’s 
Parliament. Still, Qasmi’s focus on the religious parties in Pakistan’s National Assembly tends to 
overlook the fact that, inside Parliament, these parties were greatly outnumbered by those 
with center-right and center-left positions, like the Pakistan Muslim League and, especially, the 
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)—not only in the PPP-led government of 1974 (12 percent 
  
religious parties in Parliament), but in every civilian government since then: 1988, 1990, 1993, 
1997, 2008, 2013, and 2018. The specific influence of Parliament’s religious parties, in other 
words, is not unlike that of the conservative religious activists who sought to influence 
Pakistan’s first CA: in the end, the formal legal reach of their twenty-two-point manifesto was 
bound to forms of political acquiescence within the CA as a whole.  
What accounts for Pakistan’s rereading of its imported religious freedom provisions is not 
the “Islamizing” dictatorship of General Zia, the “religious” reasoning of its courts, or the power 
of “Islamist” parties in Parliament. Instead, what accounts for Pakistan’s shifting approach is a 
much wider pattern in which enumerated rights imported from Ireland (via India) interacted 
with grassroots religious protesters who shaped an increasingly majoritarian bias in Pakistan’s 
National Assembly as a whole. This majoritarian bias is one in which efforts to protect the 
constitutional rights of Pakistan’s Muslim majority have come to be seen as requiring new 
forms of legal constraint restricting Ahmadi religious “provocation.”  
The reach of this perspective, rooted in a majoritarian approach to parliamentary 
politics underpinned by street-level protests, emerged again in October 2017, when Pakistan’s 
National Assembly responded to yet another round of religious protests by reversing a set of 
reforms in the country’s Election Act (2017). Specifically, the National Assembly voted to 
reverse a change in the oath taken by would-be candidates for national and provincial elections 
as well as a change in the bureaucratic procedures used to clarify a candidate’s religion. 
Recalling Schedule 3 of Pakistan’s 1973 constitution, the first of these two adjustments sought 
to replace an ostensibly religious affirmation with a simple declaration concerning “the 
absolute and unqualified finality of the prophethood of Muhammad.”48 The second emerged 
  
from an earlier effort, led by General Pervez Musharraf (1999–2007), to abolish separate 
electorates for “non-Muslims” while, at the same time, retaining an exception for the 
Ahmadiyya (see Conduct of Elections Executive Order No. 15 of 2002; Persecution of Ahmadis 
2009). When Parliament removed the procedure whereby individual candidates might be 
exposed as members of the Ahmadi community, protests erupted; in fact Islamabad was placed 
under siege (see Abbasi 2017). Shortly thereafter, the National Assembly sought to appease 
what it saw as the will of Pakistan’s Muslim majority. Claiming to defend the special rights of 
Muslims vis-à-vis elections, it voted unanimously to reverse its earlier reforms, retaining a 
strong religious affirmation regarding “the finality of prophethood” as well as clear procedures 
to expose candidates who might be defined as Ahmadi (see DAWN 2017).  
 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly, for those with an interest in the legal and political impact of constitutional 
borrowing, mapping textual transfers is not enough. On the contrary, the meaning of borrowed 
references only emerges within a particular political context. The challenge, I argue, lies in 
tracking the political motivations that underpin the importation (and, then, the 
“resignification”) of foreign constitutional texts.  
In Pakistan, it was not the religious orientation of judges, the influence of religious 
parliamentarians, or the formal promulgation of religious laws so much as a growing 
appreciation for “majoritarian” public attachments to a restricted sense of Muslim community 
boundaries—and, within this, fears that any encroachment on those boundaries might revive 
forms of religious vigilantism or rioting—that slowly reconfigured the meaning of constitutional 
  
clauses initially imported from outside. These imported clauses did not treat a fundamental 
right to religious freedom as absolute; from the beginning, they explicitly stated that the 
enforceability of a constitutional right to religious freedom was contingent on a shifting 
government assessment of incitement, violence, and public order. 
Drawing inspiration from the anti-colonial politics of Ireland and India more than 
European states like Britain, Pakistan clearly illustrates the ways in which explicit textual 
transplants are shaped and reshaped by the politics of constitutional meaning. Over time, and in 
different ways, Pakistani judges, politicians, and executive officials have adjusted their response 
to conservative and ultra-conservative forms of religious-cum-political agitation. Above all, they 
reversed the onus of responsibility surrounding periodic spasms of religious violence, gradually 
coming to stress the ways in which the state was constitutionally empowered to restrict the 
rights of any religious practitioner, no matter how peaceful, who might be recast, even 
preemptively, as a religious provocateur and thus a driver of public “disorder.”  
In debates regarding the status of foreign law within the United States, the late 
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia famously noted that American judges must rely on “[t]he 
standards of decency of American society—not the standards … of the world [or any+ … other 
countr[y]” (see Choudhry 2006, 7). In Pakistan, one might argue, the same view prevailed, not 
only with respect to “domestic” law, but also with respect to Pakistan’s domestic reading of 
imported “foreign” laws. In Pakistan, constitutional actors found new ways to accommodate 
longstanding debates regarding the dynamics of constitutional borrowing. Treating religious 
freedom as a constitutional “empty signifier,” they found new ways to have Watson’s (1974) 
textual cake while, at the same time, following Legrand (2001), eating it in a Pakistani way. 
  
Departing from both Ireland and India, this Pakistani way of eating slowly lost its appreciation 
for the rights of individuals or religious minorities; instead, responding to periodic bouts of 
public violence, it encouraged Pakistan’s National Assembly to privilege the political demands 
of a more narrowly defined Muslim majority. 
 
Dedication 
This article is dedicated to the memory of my colleague Lawrence Saez (1965-2018), 
who taught us much about the comparative and international politics of South Asia. 
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1 See also France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789, Article 10): “No one shall be 
disquieted on account of his … religious views, provided their manifestation does not disturb 
the public order established by law,” as well as the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR; 1966, Article 18): “Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be 
subject only to such limitations as are … necessary to protect public … order…. Pakistan 
accepted the ICCPR in 2010 with reservations regarding Article 18; those reservations were 
dropped in 2011 (see Khan 2015).  
2 For summaries of the “Watson v. Legrand” debate, see Cohn (2010) and Cairns (2013). 
3 For scholarship focusing specifically on constitutional law, see Choudhry (2006) and Hirschl 
(2014). 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
4 For constitutional migration, see Graziadei (2006); for borrowing and transplants, see Cotterell 
(2001). 
5 This argument was partly developed in conjunction with Matthew Nelson, Aslí Bali, Hannah 
Lerner, and David Mednicoff, “From Foreign Text to Local Meaning: The Politics of Religious 
Exclusion in Transnational Constitutional Borrowing,” Law and Social Inquiry (forthcoming 2020). 
6 Typically, Muslims identify the Prophet Mohammad as the final prophet of God. For an 
account of Ahmadi beliefs and practices, see Friedmann (1989). 
7 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1956, Preamble; 1973, Article 2A). 
8 Ibid. (1956, Article 32; 1973, Article 41). 
9 Ibid. (1956, Article 145; 1973, Articles 51 and 59). 
10 Gary Jacobsohn (2006) compares articulations of “constitutional identity” in Ireland and 
India; whereas I stress similarities, Jacobsohn highlights differences. 
11 Compare Ireland Constitution Committee (1922): “*T+he free profession and practice of 
religion are, subject to public order and morality, hereby guaranteed to every citizen”; Besant 
(1926, 212): “*T+he free practice of religion, subject to public order or morality, *‘will be 
guaranteed to every person’+”; and All Parties Conference and Nehru Committee (1928, 101): 
“*T+he free profession and practice of religion are, subject to public order and morality, hereby 
guaranteed to every person.” 
12 In Ireland, this adaptation of the Polish constitution emerged in “dueling drafts” between late 
1936 and March 1937 (see Keogh 2007, 154, 389). See also Constitution of the Republic of 
Poland (March 1921), Article 113: “Every religious community recognized by the state … may 
conduct independently its internal affairs; it may possess and acquire movable and immovable 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
property, administer and dispose of it; it [also] remains in possession and enjoyment of its … 
religious, educational, and charitable institutions. No religious community may, however, be in 
opposition to the statutes of the state.”  
13 For an account of the redrafting process in Ireland (1935–37), see Keogh (2007, 150–73). 
14 Additional members were later added to accommodate refugees from India as well as those 
in various princely states. Within Pakistan’s CA, East Bengal held forty-four seats, Punjab 
seventeen (plus five for refugees), Sindh four (plus one for refugees), Balochistan one, and the 
Northwest Frontier Province three, with the princely states and tribal areas holding four (see 
Binder 1961, 121–23; Callard 1957, 78–85). 
15 The Second Series (second edition) of Rau’s Constitutional Precedents also included the 
constitutions of Japan and the Republic of China. 
16 CA member Abul Kasem Khan argued that “*i+t would be idle to think that … institutions 
borrowed from any of the advanced countries … will meet our requirements.” “If you want to 
transplant any political institution *from the West+,” he added, “I am dead sure … this plant 
will not take root” (Pakistan Constituent Assembly 1953b, 276). 
17 Danchin (2008, 529–30) writes that “most African and Asian states were *still+ European 
colonies” when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights emerged in 1948. He ignores the 
role that newly independent states like India and Pakistan played in drafting this Declaration, 
especially, Article 18 regarding religious freedom (see Bhagavan 2010; Kelsay 1988; Waltz 2004). 
18 Many CA members stressed that Pakistan’s approach to fundamental rights should reflect 
principles found in the UN’s Charter of Fundamental Human Rights (see Barma and Chakravarty 
in Pakistan Constituent Assembly 1949a, 30–31, 36); however, others dismissed this, noting 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
that Pakistan should not “borrow … from a Charter which we do not know will last long.” “Our 
constitution,” they boasted, “will last longer” (Qureshi in Pakistan Constituent Assembly 1949b, 
60). 
19 This “Article 10” was retained as Article 10 in Pakistan’s first constitution (1956); it was recast 
as Article 10(a) in 1963, and then as Article 20(a) in 1973.  
20 This “Article 11” was retained as Article 11 in Pakistan’s first constitution (1956); it was recast 
as Article 10(b) in 1963, and then as Article 20(b) in 1973. 
21 In India, Muslim (minority) CA members argued for separate electorates (see Bajpai 2011, 
chap. 4). In the end, Austin (1966, 151) notes that Muslim CA members agreed to drop their 
demand for separate electorates “to ingratiate themselves with the Congress.” 
22 This Board was convened alongside the CA by a subcommittee of the CA known as the Basic 
Principles Committee (BPC) (see Nelson 2016). 
23 At full strength, the Talimat-e-Islamia Board included Sunni and Shi’i ulema (particularly Sunni 
Deobandi ulema from both Pakistan and India) as well as Muslim scholars teaching in Europe 
(for example, at the Sorbonne). The  manifesto submitted in 1951 was formulated by a larger 
group, including the lay Muslim leader of Pakistan’s Jama’at-e-Islami, Abul ala Maududi (see 
Binder 1961, 156–58, 213–15). 
24 These principles—once again reflecting constitutional patterns emerging in Ireland before 
being adopted, and adapted, in India—were nonjusticiable; their purpose lay in providing a set 
of constitutional guidelines for subsequent legislation or policy-making. 
25 In Pakistan’s first constitution (1956, Article 145), each province was entitled to determine 
the value of joint or separate electorates for itself. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
26 It is worth noting that, even within Pakistan’s first CA, the introduction of enumerated and 
enforceable rights was not a foregone conclusion. Already in 1953, Ahmed E. H. Jaffar 
anticipated the opposition articulated by General Ayub’s Commission: “I do not share the views 
of the framers … that it is necessary to enunciate the fundamental rights,” he declared (adding, 
with reference to religious elites, that he also opposed the elevation of any authority that might 
“limit the authority of … Parliament”) (Pakistan Constituent Assembly 1953a, 117). 
27 For the composition of General Ayub’s Commission, see Newman (1962, 360). 
28 On convergence, see Finnemore and Sikkink (1998); Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999); and 
Tushnet (2009). On the limits of convergence, see Dixon and Posner (2010–11) and 
Goldsworthy (2006). 
29 On the rehabilitation of activists’ patriotic credentials, see Azhar (1944, 244–47) and Kamran 
(2015, 1858, 1861).  
30 On the protesters’ claim of affinity with “majority” opinion, see Saeed (2018, 102–3). 
31 Disagreements regarding the Nehru Report (1928) led the Lahore-based Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-
Islam to distance itself from the Indian National Congress; the Majlis pressed [CUT: it was 
pressing] for a more explicitly communal approach, beginning with a “separate electorate” for 
Muslims (see Awan 2010). Urdu-language sources outlining the views of the Majlis, including 
Afzal Haq’s Tarikh-e-Ahrar (1968), are examined by Kamran (2015).  
32 Following Maududi’s conviction, his death sentence was later commuted (see Tahir 2009, 
564). 
33 Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri v. West Pakistan (1969) PLD (Lah.) 289 (Pak.). 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
34 For the ways in which bureaucratic forms of state recognition interact with the practice and 
politics of religious “self-identification,” see Nelson and Shah (2018). 
35 Abdul Rehman Mubashir v. Amir Ali Shah (1978) PLD (Lah.) 113. 
36 Ibid., 146. 
37 On religious-freedom restrictions in India, see Osuri (2013); again, public order concerns have 
been cited to support restrictions on (“nonessential”) minority practices that offend majority 
sentiment. 
38 On the political and “public order” motivations underpinning Zia’s reforms, see Saeed (2011, 
88) and Kazi (2015, 129). 
39 Ahmed (2009) describes the colonial roots of Pakistan’s blasphemy law but does not address 
the ways in which Pakistan’s religious-freedom laws (as constitutional laws) were explicitly set 
apart from the British tradition. 
40 Zaheeruddin v. The State (1993) 26 SCMR (SC) 1718. 
41 In Malaysia, the courts adopted a similar view in barring Christians from using Muslim words 
like “Allah” (see Neo 2014). 
42 Specifically, the Supreme Court described the Ahmadiyya faith as “a serious and organized 
attack on *Islam’s+ ideological frontiers” that is “bound to give rise to a serious law and order 
situation” (Zaheeruddin 1993, 1765). The Court noted that Muslims could not be blamed for 
losing “control” after encountering the “blasphemous” material produced by Ghulam Ahmad. 
“*I+t is,” the Court argued, “like permitting *a+ civil war” (1777; see also Alvi 1993). 
43 Here, the Pakistan Supreme Court ignored US Supreme Court reasoning, noting that, 
although the state was not empowered to ban the peaceful and essential practices of selected 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
religious groups, it could, for the sake of public order, legally regulate the practices of all 
religious groups (for example, with an administrative requirement noting that any group 
engaged in a religious procession would have to obtain a permit, however “essential” the 
procession may be). In Pakistan, the Court held that the state was entitled to ban, not a 
particular practice for all religious groups, but almost all of the practices of a particular group.  
44 For a similar rereading of US Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding free speech in Israel, see 
Jacobsohn (1993). 
45 When Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto suggested blasphemy law amendments in 1994 (such as 
imprisonment for false allegations), her proposals were defeated in Parliament. When 
parliamentarian Sherry Rehman called for such reforms after the assassination of Punjab 
Governor Salman Taseer (who did the same in 2011), she faced death threats. Even today, Zia’s 
reforms remain intact. In 2015, however, the Pakistan Supreme Court upheld the execution of 
Taseer’s assassin in a judgment criticizing vigilante violence and noting that Pakistan’s 
blasphemy laws were not immune to future legislative reform; see Mumtaz Qadri v. The State 
(2015) Crim. Appeal 210. 
46 Mujibur Rahman v. Pakistan (1988) PLD (SC) 167. 
47 For a similar account of the Federal Shariat Court judgment in Mujibur Rahman v. Pakistan 
(1988), see Kazi (2015, 111, 113).  
48 Those who refused to sign this declaration were relegated to Pakistan’s “non-Muslim” 
(Ahmadi) electorate. 
